

## The Cinema Alone

Essays on the Work of

Jean-Luc Godard
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## 8 The Evidence and Uncertainty of Silent Film in HISTOIRE(S) DU CINÉMA

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The radicality of Jean-Luc Godard's ніsтоїке(s) du сіnéma lies not so much in the dizzying bombardment of images drawn from the collected archives of cinema history, but rather in the parallel dislocation, equally vertiginous, presented by the problematic of the project itself. This project, a meditation on the relationship between the historical, cinematic, and moral planes of the twentieth century, is perhaps more concretely a reworking of the Bazinian question: 'What is cinema?' While this fundamentally ontological project is hardly new for film theory, or even for Godard (and is, in fact, the question posed by every Godard film), what is striking about this work is his invocation and utilisation of the silent era, and particularly the films of Louis Feuillade, as a pathway to answering this question. In this essay, I will argue that Godard's use of silent cinema, and particularly the cinematic mode of 'uncertainty' that Feuillade's cinema represents, serves as the foundation in histoire(s) du cinéma for a poetic rewriting of the century's cinema and social history, a rewriting which, I shall suggest, has consequences not just for historiography but also for philosophy and, in particular, ethical issues of gender and identity.

A reference to Louis Feuillade's 1913-1914 silent serial fantômas appears near the end of Chapter 1A, TOUTES LES HISTOIRES, via an abbreviated quotation from André Malraux's Esquisse d'une psychologie du cinéma, and sets in place the ethical and epistemological frame for the rest of HISTOIRE(S) DU CINÉMA. The quotation in the video is as follows:

The masses love myth and cinema addresses the masses. But if myth begins with Fantômas it ends with Christ. What did the crowds hear when they listened to Saint Bernard preach? Something other than what he said? Perhaps, no doubt. But how can we ignore what we understand when that unknown voice plunges deep into our hearts?'

Of particular importance in this quotation is the gap or hesitation between the word and thing (as evidenced by the gap by what is spoken and what is understood) – the inability of language to convey *directly* its intended meaning. And this gap between word and thing goes to the heart of Godard's attraction to silent era film-making, for silent film gives us the thing prior to the oppressive conditions put in place by the name:

The image doesn't name. Silent cinema was a great cultural and popular revolution. It didn't name, but we recognised everything and knew everything. With the sound film industry, we started naming again.<sup>2</sup>

As we can see from the full text of the original quotation by Malraux,<sup>3</sup> Fantômas represents for Malraux a highly dualistic and moralistic universe where good and evil are clearly demarcated. But Malraux's judgment of Fantômas appears less interesting to Godard than the commentary's ability both to foreground our gaps in speech-driven knowledge and to highlight an alternative, but rarely pursued or recognised, mode of thought ('what we understand when that *unknown* voice plunges deep into our hearts'). Godard's use of Fantômas in this instance is neither casual nor accidental, and despite the fact that the references to Feuillade's films throughout HISTOIRE(S) DU CINÉMA are often oblique and fleeting (beyond the Malraux quotation, our only references to the crime serials are a FANTÔMAS poster and the title: JUDEX), the debt to Feuillade is clear.

Feuillade's films, especially the crime serials, represent an alternative path or counter history that defies the usual categories of cinema history—the 'cinema of attractions' and 'classical cinema'. Neither exclusively driven to 'show' a spectacular event nor to 'tell' a story, Feuillade's films present, rather, a preoccupation with the limits of knowledge. In the fantômas series, for example, the overarching Manichean structure of good and evil (implemented by the detective's pursuit of the criminal, Fantômas) is itself put into question by the inability to discern what good and evil might be exactly. Indeed, the most salient trait aligned to the master criminal Fantômas is that he is elusive or *insaisissable*, a 'quality' that is founded not so much on strength or skill but on the fact that he is *unrecognisable* to the police or public—or even his lovers and accomplices. Ultimately, this problem of misrecognition in fantômas speaks to the larger issue of a crisis in *visible evidence*—a crisis that is replayed in numerous Feuillade films.

A second, and important, reference to Feuillade occurs in HISTOIRE(S) DU CINÉMA Chapter 1B, UNE HISTOIRE SEULE. The presentation of a photograph of the silent era film-maker overlaid with the text, ERREUR TRAGIQUE, the title of a two-reel drama made by Feuillade in 1913, points to an ongoing fascination that Godard has with the film. The title recurs in Chapter 3B, UNE VAGUE NOUVELLE, and is mentioned both directly and indirectly in interviews with Godard. The film's primary concern, like FANTÔMAS, is with the status of visual evidence. In ERREUR TRAGIQUE, a husband discovers his wife's 'infidelity' via a close examination of a film strip (his wife has been

photographed accidentally in the background of a short comic film). While the raw data during the husband's examination of the film's individual frames irrefutably reveals the wife to be in the company of another man, the infidelity is merely the husband's projection. However, it is the apodictic quality of the image that serves as the legitimation of the husband's narrative. As Godard notes, the cinema's (and the photograph's) scientific side produces compelling testimony:

Because even these days, if someone says your wife's cheating on you, you don't necessarily believe them. But if you see a photo there's something about vision which is considered irrefutable.<sup>6</sup>

However, Feuillade's film ruptures the closure of the banal story of adultery by *continuing* the story line (and better still, the obvious 'reality'). There is another narrative: the wife was in the company of her brother, thereby falsifying the husband's story line. What happens, Feuillade's film asks, between the individual frames, beyond the seemingly irrefutable given?

What is fascinating about HISTOIRE(S) DU CINÉMA is that Godard's method throughout the series *mimics* the husband's investigation of the search for evidence, but with a very important difference. At the very opening of Chapter 1A, we see a progressive and associative link of images from the still camera (the shifting, searching eyes of Jeffries (James Stewart) in REAR WINDOW as he looks through a telephoto lens) to an iris shot of a character with a magnifying glass, and then to a close-up of the eye itself through a magnifying glass. The still camera, the magnifying glass and the eye's isolation of data, or the single frame of information in the case of Erreur Tragique, all point to the mistaken vision found in the image in singularity - what Bergson calls the deception of ordinary or cinematographic knowledge. This is the idea that reality is but an assemblage of fixed moments or 'snapshots' which can be abstracted from time without any loss of veracity.7 Thus, Godard moves to show us the way out of error with a shot of an editing machine presented in close-up, from an investigation of vision and the image to the complications put in place by cinematic vision, an image in movement. Here we can see not only a larger field of information to survey under the microscope, but the added dimension that a slice of time can be run forward, backward, or stopped, which the opening demonstrates to us via the actions of the Steenbeck as it appears to search a strip of film repeatedly. This process is then doubled by a fade-in of Ida Lupino (as Mildred Donner in Lang's WHILE THE CITY SLEEPS) dropping a slide into a hand viewer for inspection, and then the overlap of the two images together (Lupino and the Steenbeck). The soundtrack, slowed to an indistinguishable groan, now matches Lupino's every move (the first soundtrack

'matched' with the Lupino image, was from a separate film). As the image is slowed and then stopped, we see not only the subtleties of gesture as the woman drops the slide into the viewer, but also the space between the frames, since Godard places black frames into the sequence to highlight the illusion of movement and the simultaneously scientific (the detail of movement) and false information provided by the cinema. The scientific dimension emerges from the cinema's ability to give us any possible alteration from frame to frame, thus mimicking our own *ethical* options (we can choose one option over others at every instant), and highlighting the need for precisely such a tool of measurement. But the illusion is our daily belief that no other alteration or choice is available to us, in cinema or in everyday life. By foregrounding the black frames in the sequence, Godard points to other cinemas, other edits, other actions, other choices.

The crisis of singular vision is underlined for us by another important reference that occurs in the voice-over at the end of Chapter 1A (and is also seen in a soundless video clip from JLG/JLG: AUTOPORTRAIT DE DÉCEMBRE in Chapter 3A, LA MONNAIE DE L'ABSOLU). The voice-over, an abbreviated quotation from Ludwig Wittgenstein's *On Certainty*, is as follows:

'You have two hands?', asks the blind man. But it isn't in looking at my hands that I assure myself of this. Yes, why should I have confidence in my eyes if I am in doubt. Yes, why isn't it my eyes that I'm going to verify when I look if I see my two hands.<sup>8</sup>

The use of Wittgenstein here suggests more than a general skepticism about the limits of vision. What I believe is at stake, and what accounts for Godard's use of Wittgenstein in the opening of HISTOIRE(S) DU CINÉMA, is rather a larger consistency of philosophical method across these two theorists' works.

Wittgenstein's text is in large measure a response to the philosopher G.E. Moore's essay 'Proof of an External World'. To summarise Moore, there is a certain ontological *obviousness* to what we see and, in turn, a whole range of things that we can *know* based on sight. This is provided that the thing in question is not merely 'presented' but can be 'met with in space', and is 'logically independent of my perception of it at the time'. Now this last caveat is particularly interesting in that this *eliminates* things like dreams, shadows, hallucinations, mirror images or reflections of any sort, that is to say, the very entities that are used ordinarily to call into question the truth status of vision. Thus, to prove existence of an external world, Moore says simply: 'Here's one hand and here's another'. According to Moore, this is an event which we could all test, that is, physically investigate to see if it is true. No doubt such a test would not satisfy the skeptic, who could propose an *infinite* number of possible scenarios to invalidate the claim, but in that case,

nothing would be useful as evidence. To put this another way, Moore claims he *knows* the existence of an external world because to dispel the skeptical alternative (that I may be dreaming, for example) would be a *logical impossibility* (i.e. there would never be enough tests which could be performed as proof).

Wittgenstein's response to Moore is not simply to say, 'yes, but what if you were dreaming, etc.'. Rather, he takes issue with Moore's comment that to know his hands are in front of him is the same thing as knowing that an external world exists. Moreover, we would like to believe, Wittgenstein states, that what we know 'guarantees it is a fact'. However, 'one always forgets the expression, "I thought I knew". The use of the term 'I know' does not at all provide the obvious certainty implied by Moore as the phrase is not dependent on any sort of fixed standard or tests. Wittgenstein writes:

'I know' often means: I have the proper grounds for my statement. So if the other person is acquainted with the language game, he would admit that I know. The other, if he is acquainted with the language game, must be able to imagine *how* one may know something of the kind. <sup>14</sup>

Thus, certainty has, paradoxically, a particular quality of contingency. It is not that the word 'certainty', or any other word, is meaningless or illegitimate, but rather that it is dependent upon our ability to use the term correctly in a given context, or, as Wittgenstein puts it, in a 'language game'. That is, there is no essential quality to the meaning of any word but rather similarities, or family resemblances, that enable the consistent use of a term, like certainty, in a particular setting. Our participation in a language game is thus the correct performance of a given word's usage. To put this another way, words have no essential meaning in isolation.

It is this slippery and *performative* status of the term 'knowledge' or 'certainty' that Godard appears to appropriate. Furthermore, this is the lesson of the silent era's cinema before the naming, that is, the cinema before the fixity of language, narrative, and sound. This is also the lesson from Feuillade's erreur tragique since, despite the most careful scrutiny of the image, the husband still did not account for the gap in the narrative. Before condemning the wife, we need to know the context of the image, the field of frames that surround it, no matter how much we believe the truth to be definitely before us. It is this factual illusion of the image in isolation – or in the seeming isolation of the cinematic image endlessly flowing onward without a break between the frames – which provides for a form of tyranny in the image, and even tyranny in our everyday lives. Thus, the 'usine de rêves' is easily transformed into a factory of horrors as Godard demonstrates for us with an extremely slow overlap dissolve between Chaplin and Hitler in

Chapter 4B, LES SIGNES PARMI NOUS (Chaplin seems to mutate gradually into Hitler).

What is of interest here is not only the proximity of good and evil and our inability to discriminate between the two, but the fluidity and potential alteration of matter in the frame. This is what the cinema shows and alternatively attempts to conceal through language and narrative: that even matter can be transformed by time. The cinematic frames register this process of transformation. A predictable and sequential organisation of the frames lends us the notion of certainty as obvious, natural and immutable. But any disruption of linearity, or the sequential, points us toward an 'escape' from matter as a fixed or certain entity. Hence, Godard defines the cinema as 'doing' metaphysics, that is, *performing* the possibilities of being:<sup>18</sup>

Cinema is there to do metaphysics. Moreover, that's what it actually does although no one sees it, or rather those who do it don't say so. Cinema is something extremely physical on account of the fact that it is a mechanical invention. It is there for escape, and to escape is of the order of metaphysics.<sup>19</sup>

There is no break or contradiction between the metaphysical inclinations of the cinema and its scientific or mechanical qualities. Rather, what you have is an ongoing exchange of possibilities and experimentation. It is not a teleological explanation of being that such a metaphysics implies, but a radical notion of movement and choice in any direction as possible. In this light, it is easier to read the second iteration of ERREUR TRAGIQUE in Chapter 3B. Now the film title is overlaid on a blank cinema screen – the empty screen drawing attention to the multiple possibilities contained therein rather than a fixed image.

The empty screen suggests not only the myriad possibilities of the next frame, but can also be seen as referring to the space between the frames itself. One might read ERREUR TRAGIQUE's projection on the white screen as the reversal – both metaphorical and literal – of the black space between the images. The attention to gaps or the interstitial space between the frames is a key element of HISTOIRE(S) DU CINÉMA.<sup>20</sup> Beyond the often long stretches of black frames noted above in the Lupino example, Godard also uses short and sometimes single-frame edits, inserting (or more accurately cross-cutting) black-and-white frames within a film clip to induce a type of flicker effect. This technique is in place in the opening moments of Chapter 1A as Godard edits extra black frames into a sequence from KING KONG (when Fay Wray is filmed by an on-screen cameraman) as a way of demonstrating the spaces between the unfolding frames of the cinema image. Hence, the *potential* arbitrariness of the linking of images is clear, and, like ERREUR TRAGIQUE, another narrative can emerge. Godard also points to another history coex-

tensive to our fictional film past by juxtaposing and relentlessly cross-cutting not only Hollywood and Nazism throughout the series, but also Lenin and Soviet montage film-making (indeed, sometimes all these groupings interspersed). The title for Chapter 1A is TOUTES LES HISTOIRES, that is, 'all the histories,' and as Godard notes at one point in the chapter, this entails a plural sense of history (the commentary states at first, 'avec des s', and then a reminder of the Nazi heritage, 'des SS';<sup>21</sup> the Chapter 4B slow dissolve noted earlier between Chaplin and Hitler demonstrates the proximity and intersection of these histories). He follows this comment with remarks that point to the breadth of the possibilities therein: 'all the histories that could have been, that will be, that were'. Between these shifts in verb tense are the possibilities of other histories to be witnessed. The gap has not been closed for us, and there are multiple histories to be written.

This understanding of history is consistent with Godard's use of Wittgenstein. For while Godard's reference to Wittgenstein's language game foregrounds the context of an image, it is also important to remember that the notion of context is itself somewhat specialised. The larger epistemological lesson of Wittgenstein's 'language game' is that there are no fixed meanings, although they are somewhat fixed with the context of the game (this distinguishes Wittgenstein's position from radical skepticism or relativism). Godard clues us into his historical method in Chapter 1A which starts with the Bresson quotation, 'Don't go showing all aspects of things. Leave for yourself a margin of indeterminacy'. To be precise, the quotation, like many if not all quotations by Godard, is altered from the original Bresson text which states: 'Don't show all aspects of things. Leave a margin of indeterminacy.' Godard's alteration of the Bresson statement shows us a philosophy as action, process, movement.

Moreover, what might be inserted in this undefined margin, in the historical/narrative gaps, is also of interest in terms of methodology. In one extraordinary sequence from Chapter 1A, immediately after announcing the range of his historical project, 'all the histories that could have been', Godard induces a type of false flicker effect through the overlap of three separate images: (i) Godard in his library, (ii) a Norma Shearer publicity photograph, (iii) the crop duster sequence from Hitchcock's NORTH BY NORTHWEST. He then intercuts the three images with the Hitchcock sequence slightly dominant (i.e. in terms of time on screen). The 'flicker' effect is produced by overlapping at least two of the images and bringing the individual images into view by quick iris-ins and iris-outs with the white background of Shearer's publicity photograph enhancing the effect. Godard thereby inserts himself into the history of Hollywood cinema and foregrounds his position as a *commentator* on that history. That is to say, Godard

is not at all implying that this history is *objective* or *the only true history*. In addition, Godard's opening of 1A includes the vertically positioned and disjunctive spelling out of the word *histoire(s)*, so that *toi* (you) appears alone in the gap of the word and is repeated. The technique suggests both an interpellation of us as viewers to this history and a place for us within this history (as agents, spectators, historians).

The crucial dimension behind these multiple histories is that they are neither autonomous nor relative. Rather, we are forced by the juxtaposition of images and the gaps in between to make a relational inference or correspondence amongst the materials. It is, in effect, a *poetic* history, as Godard makes clear to us with the ending of Chapter 1B, UNE HISTOIRE SEULE. Here, Godard quotes a passage (again, an edited or altered passage) from Martin Heidegger's essay, 'What are Poets for?':

Poets are those mortals who sing solemnly sensing the trace of the gods that have fled, who stay on the gods' tracks and so trace for mortals, their brethren, the road for turning back. But who, among the mortals, is capable of detecting such a trace? Traces are often not apparent and are always the legacy of a summons that is barely foretold. To be a poet in a destitute time means to attend, singing, to the trace of the gods that have fled. That is why at the time of the world's night the poet utters the sacred.<sup>24</sup>

The tone of Heidegger's essay, the 'time of destitution', is matched by Godard's relentless display of images from the most horrific moments of this century. But for Heidegger (and Heidegger is using a reading of Rilke's poetry to make his point), the period is 'destitute' not only as a result of the events themselves – it is also a product of our perspective and memory:

The time remains destitute not only because God is dead, but because mortals are hardly aware and capable even of their own mortality. Mortals have not yet come into ownership of their own nature. Death withdraws into the enigmatic. The mystery of pain remains veiled. Love has not been learned. But mortals are. They are, in that there is language. Song still lingers over their destitute land. The singer's word still keeps to the trace of the holy.<sup>25</sup>

Thus, the 'turning back' from the destitution requires a new mode of thought performed for us in HISTOIRE(S) DU CINÉMA by the Steenbeck's replaying and forwarding of the film and the restoration of a certain amount of memory ('the trace of the holy'). Before we can turn away, we must first face the horror: 'In the age of the world's night, the abyss of the world must be experienced and endured. But for this it is necessary that there must be those who reach into the abyss.' The poèt leads us to a different awareness and into a type of being 'in the world', which Heidegger demarcates as the

'Open', a 'space' that cannot be accessed by representation and exists inde-

pendently of human consciousness.27

How does the poet help us reach the 'Open'? The method of organisation in Godard is not strictly speaking an association but rather, as Gilles Deleuze notes, a process of 'differentiation'. \* We can see this mode of operation at work in other Godard films, for example COMMENT ÇA VA, a film that is also an extended exploration on how we see and what we know. It opens with the statement: 'a film between the active and the passive'. The key term as Deleuze points out in another context (ICI ET AILLEURS and SIX FOIS DEUX) is the conjunction 'and':

It is the method of BETWEEN, 'between two images', which does away with all cinema of the One. It is the method of AND, 'this and then that', which does away with all the cinema of Being = is. Between two actions, between two affections, between two perceptions, between two visual images, between two sound images, between the sound and the visual: make the indiscernible, that is the frontier, visible (SIX FOIS DEUX). The whole undergoes a mutation, because it has ceased to be the one-Being, in order to become the constitutive 'and' of things, the constitutive between-two of images.<sup>39</sup>

But how precisely does this method of 'and' operate in Godard? Most crucially, we need to look at the workings of montage which, as we know, is one of Godard favourite topics (and Chapter 4A, LE CONTRÔLE DE L'UNIVERS, features a special homage to the master of montage, Alfred Hitchcock). Godard depends, like early cinema and Feuillade, on the 'shock' cut. The clearest proponent of this editing strategy from the silent era is, of course, Georges Méliès. In Méliès the use of stop motion photography is used to create a 'trick effect': a person disappears, limbs and heads are excised from the body (and sometimes reassembled), vehicles are subjected to precipitous falls (which crumble but leave the occupants to emerge none the worse for wear). This is usually done, however, within the context of a science fiction or performance venue (the conjurer) and produces laughter and surprise, rarely disorientation or disturbance. In the case of Feuillade, the 'trick' effects and 'shock' cuts occur within a seemingly everyday setting. In the crime serials, Feuillade mixes realist mise-en-scène, the long take (and usually deep space) tableau, and an urban detective narrative in conjunction with the 'shock' cut. Here the cuts are not playful or performative, but rather traumatic and unexpected. Suddenly, the character falls from an upper story window or over a cliff with often an equally sudden appearance of someone below to rescue or capture the person imperilled.30

It is this ongoing juxtaposition of the 'realistic' and the 'illusory', of the 'documentary' and the 'fictional', that propels forward so much of

HISTOIRE(S) DU CINÉMA. Of course, the slippage between real and unreal states is not new for Godard (nor the interrogation of the modes therein), but what is new, or at least qualitatively different, is the speed with which we must deal with the shock. We move from beautiful, and indeed sublime, images from art and nature to explicit and gruesome scenes of animal slaughter, war, executions and imprisonment. Functioning much like the lingering static shots of resplendent nature (in terms of Deleuze's 'differentiation') in JLG/JLG and NOUVELLE VAGUE, there is a certain relentless focus on the images of the grotesque in HISTOIRE(s) DU CINÉMA. This is yet another parallel with Feuillade as a number of unusually gruesome crimes are carefully detailed for us, especially in FANTÔMAS. HISTOIRE(S) DU CINÉMA challenges the viewer to watch the brutality, and, anticipating our glance away, repeats the images for us again and again. Thus, there is a doubled effect of the repeated shock within the frame (the grotesque) and across frames (from the sublime to the grotesque). And, of course, the strategy is consistent with our journey to Heidegger's 'abyss'.

Deleuze calls this radical disjunction between edits an 'irrational cut', a technique that produces a particularly interesting effect. Deleuze is referring to UNE FEMME MARIÉE but his remarks are equally descriptive of the structure of HISTOIRE(S) DU CINÉMA:

From this perspective, the internal monologue gives way to sequences of images, each sequence being independent, and each image in the sequence standing for itself in relation to the preceding and following ones: a different descriptive material. There are no longer any perfect and 'resolved' harmonies, but only dissonant tunings or irrational cuts, because there are no more harmonics of the image, but only 'unlinked' tones forming the series. What disappears is all metaphor or figure.<sup>31</sup>

This disappearance of metaphor and figure does not signal the death of all meaning in Godard and thereby an exclusive focus on *aesthetics* rather than language or politics. Rather, what Godard is gesturing towards are new forms of meaning, expression, and thought, and the politics that emerge as a result. However, if perception is suspect and metaphor vanishes (direct and indirect access to a thing), then can we still communicate, can we still 'write' an *histoire(s)*? Perhaps the most explicit answer to this question comes in Chapter 2A, SEUL LE CINÉMA. The episode opens with Godard in discussion about the 'work of the historian' and he underlines there the need for a 'precise definition' or 'scientific' quality in his method. Shortly after we are presented with a segment entitled 'Envoi 1' which features a lengthy video sequence (almost to the end of the episode) of a young woman reading excerpts from Baudelaire's 'Le Voyage'. In the context of Godard's comments about science and history, we can see the poem directing us away from lin-

ear or rational methodology. As the text from Baudelaire as cited in HISTOIRE(s) DU CINÉMA reads: 'Man's fortune is absurd; the goal can change its place,/ And, being nowhere, can perhaps be anywhere!" The slippage and ambiguity of meaning noted in Baudelaire's poem is visualised for us by a clip from the NIGHT OF THE HUNTER cross-cut with an earlier part of the reading. Here, the children escape the threat of the preacher (Robert Mitchum) by taking a boat down the river, this voyage passing quite quickly from immediate danger to an idyllic and dreamlike universe where an inversion of nature to man, in terms of foreground and background, seems to take place. As Deleuze points out in his discussion of the sequence, 'the whole of nature takes on the responsibility of the children's movement of flight, and the boat where they take refuge seems itself a motionless shelter on a floating island or conveyor belt'.33 To put this another way, the human subject is no longer defining or controlling the universe exclusively. Nor is a shift of background meant to foreground an absence of meaning or to imply man's fundamental passivity. It is as if the film has flipped sides of a mirror or performed a type of rapid inverted rack focus to give us a reversal of perspective. The effect is to open up vision or thought and promote what Heidegger might call a 'releasement' towards the world (and into the 'Open') – a type of knowledge or thought 'beyond the distinction between activity and passivity'.34 The interesting aspect of 'releasement' or 'meditative' thought (as opposed to calculative or rational thought) is that it is always in movement, a process of 'going toward' an object or 'moving-intonearness'.35 But this meditative thinking can never be an end point, for 'we presage the nature of thinking as releasement. Only to forget releasement again as quickly'.36

It is this movement of thought and history that Godard's cinema projects for us, a movement between beauty, sexuality, eroticism, pornography, and back again, or between nature, children, machines, war, death, and back (or any other number of variations and linkages). The pattern of progression is not linear, but rather *recursive*. As Douglas Hofstadter comments:

Sometimes recursion seems to brush paradox very closely. For example, there are recursive definitions. Such a definition may give the casual viewer the impression that something is being defined in terms of itself. That would be circular and lead to infinite regress or paradox. This is because a recursive definition never defines something in terms of itself, but always in terms of *simpler versions of itself*. <sup>37</sup>

The visual style of recursion is seen most clearly according to Hofstadter in M.C. Escher's works. Here, the reversal is in place from foreground to background and back again, but simultaneously, in the space of one image.<sup>38</sup> Godard's HISTOIRE(S) DU CINÉMA functions similarly, perhaps most strik-

ingly in a sequence from Chapter 3A, LA MONNAIE DE L'ABSOLU. Godard uses multiple fade-ins and outs with two overlapping sequences: one from Hitchcock's THE BIRDS (the moment when the birds attack the school house), and a documentary clip from wartime footage of a bomber on the attack (this second clip was actually used in Chapter 1A over the Malraux commentary on fantômas). The sequence is initiated by the words 'What is cinema?' ('QU'EST-CE QUE LE CINÉMA?') written over a close-up of the tortured and bloodied resistance fighter Manfredi (Marcello Pagliero) in Rossellini's ROME, OPEN CITY, then cuts to documentary scenes of massacres (two shots in sequence, one repeated from the first episode). The audio track is taken from Jean Cocteau's LE TESTAMENT D'ORPHÉE: 'what horror' ('quelle horreur'). The first answer we receive in text form to the question 'what is cinema?' is 'nothing' ('RIEN') placed on an all black screen. Now the recursion becomes most explicit. The bird sequence and the bombing sequence are overlapped so that both appear equally visible in the image: the birds are flying up and off the playground bars to begin their attack on the children as the bomber drops down in the sky, the counter motion up and down within the frame by the two images mapping a type of recursion in itself. Again, alternating back to the black screen, the text asks us: 'what does it [cinema] want?' ('QUE VEUT-IL?'). Another angle of the visual recursion within the frame is displayed: the children run down the hill towards the camera at a diagonal as the other image has the plane cutting across the frame left to right in a lateral movement. The text answers (still on black background): 'everything' ('TOUT'). Now a new level of reversal takes over, and one image fades up or down in relation to the other with first the Hitchcock sequence dominating, then the bombing. It produces a type of flicker effect similar to Chapter 1A's NORTH BY NORTHWEST/Shearer/Godard sequence. The text poses another question: 'what is it [cinema] capable of?' ('QUE PEUT-IL?' over a black background), which is followed by another title card: 'something' ('QUELQUE CHOSE'). The absolutes put in place by the text ('RIEN'/'TOUT') are displaced by the end of the sequence by an ambiguous 'quelque chose' - not the thing in itself, but the possible, which is demonstrated by the visual recursion. It is also interesting to note that this particular sequence is followed rather quickly (within a few frames) by another visual reference to the JLG/JLG sequence that quotes Wittgenstein's On Certainty.

Of course, most cinema tries to shut down these gaps, the possible reversals, and this is usually done through the workings of narrative. Like the husband in ERREUR TRAGIQUE, classical cinema will fill in any gaps in evidence by supplying the most 'obvious' or 'self-evident' story line. Here, the woman's trip to the park, to the space outside the home, cannot be innocent

but is being overdetermined by a sexualised scenario (cinema being, as Godard frequently notes, obsessed with only two stories, the girl and the gun). When the narrative inevitability of this trajectory is altered a type of dislocation may occur. The husband runs to his wife's rescue but is too late to save her from his act of sabotage (her carriage has an accident). Neither relieved that the husband has arrived on time (although fortunately the wife survives), nor filled with grief that he is late (since she does live), we are rather left only with a vague sense of disturbance... with something. This is the general pattern and effect of Feuillade's crime serials. In the early serials, FANTÔMAS and LES VAMPIRES, the detectives and journalists chase the criminals endlessly. The criminals constantly metamorphose (through costume or, in LES VAMPIRES, through multiple leaders of gangs) beyond recognition. The structure is not only non-linear (circular and repetitive, but without any real end point or achievement), but also, like the visual pattern described above, recursive (gangs pursue the virtuous and vice versa). Or often in Feuillade's crime films the narrative lines are multiplied – there is more than one gang, sometimes working against, sometimes working for the main gang. And some criminals turn to 'the other side' (the law), but often only to turn back again. We are then made aware that there is not one narrative but numerous narrative lines that we must follow... numerous histories.

HISTOIRE(S) DU CINÉMA also makes an explicit link with the narrative suspension of silent serials. The ending (or lack thereof) of the serial film is mimed at the close of each episode of HISTOIRE(s) DU CINÉMA with its use of the title card 'à suivre' ('to be continued'). But these open endings might also be read as a reference to the multiple histories in circulation. Anne-Marie Miéville's LE LIVRE DE MARIE is connected physically to Godard's JE vous SALUE, MARIE via the title card 'en ce temps-là' ('at that time'), a type of structure found repeatedly in the silent serial. For example, the scripts for FANTÔMAS are filled with expressions like 'au moment où' ('at the moment when', or 'just as'). The imminent reversibility of all events signified by the phrase is then visualised by those abrupt or irrational cuts seen in both Feuillade and Godard. In the case of LE LIVRE DE MARIE and JE VOUS SALUE, MARIE, by linking their two films in this manner (Godard repeats the phrase throughout JE vous SALUE, MARIE), Godard and Miéville appear to be suggesting not so much that the two Marys are one and the same, a child then a woman,39 but rather that there is a multiple pathing of history(ies) and nar-

It is important to remember that the strategy of recursion in Feuillade's films, as in Godard's, operates not only at the level of narrative but also at the visual. The bodies and costumes of the master criminals Fantômas (René Navarre), in the series of the same name, and his *femme fatale* counterpart

Irma Vep (Musidora) in Les Vampires, function as moving screens (or frames within frames). These mobile screens, signified by the black *maillot de soie* (a tight form-fitting bodysuit), have the eerie effect of both drawing attention to, and denying, the physical properties of difference. They are a type of moving reversal image; the stark black figure on the often brightly lit and spare surroundings are the ultimate recursion. And if one recognises that the recursion happens across films, from fantômas to les vampires, as well as across sex/gender boundaries, then the potential of the recursive moment to visualise the political implications of the poetic comes to the foreground. The centered, cohesive self drops out in poetic language, where, as the theorist/film-maker Trinh T. Minh-ha notes:

There is no 'I' that just stands for *myself*. The 'I' is there; it has to be there, but it is there as the site where all other 'I's can enter and cut across one another. This is an example of the very strength and vitality of poetical language and of how it can radically contribute to the questioning of the relationship of subjects to power, language and meaning in theory. Theory as practised by many is often caught in a positioning where the theorist continues to stand in a 'safe place' to theorise about others.<sup>40</sup>

The poetic is not then in this instance an example of solely formal preoccupation, but a radical rethinking of fundamental categories, beginning with the subject, the 'I'.

At times, Godard's HISTOIRE(s) DU CINÉMA seems to be an elegy written particularly for the silent era – a series in mourning for the lost promise of another kind of cinema, a cinema of uncertainty and possibility. There is another important silent film reference that must be addressed in this context. Léonce Perret's le mystère des roches de kador of 1912 occurs prominently in Chapters 1 A and 2 A of HISTOIRE(S) DU CINÉMA, and glimpses of the key image from the scene flash repeatedly throughout the entire work. While the particulars of the narrative are too convoluted to do it justice in a brief exposition, it is perhaps instructive to note the following. A young woman (Suzanne de Formel) has been led to believe (in error) that she has shot and wounded her beloved (Captain Jean D'Erquy). This piece of misinformation induces in turn amnesia. In an effort to cure his fiancée, D'Erquy enlists the aid of a professor whose area of research includes 'the application of cinematography to psychotherapy'. The professor restages the original trauma of the shooting, and thereby demonstrates that Suzanne was, in fact, drugged throughout the shooting. The amnesiac suddenly emerges from her catatonic state, stands before the now blank screen, gestures wildly and faints. The woman's true history is restored, and, as the title card states: 'she cries... she is saved!'.

It is this last sequence of the woman rising before the all white screen that is repeated in Godard's series. Here, Godard points not only to the curative powers of the cinema, but more particularly to a desire to restage and restore a history (and histories) of the cinema and the traumatic events of this century on this empty screen. That this cure is acted out on the woman's body is not without interest. Women scholars, especially feminists, have discussed at length the role of women in Godard's films, but it is a matter of some debate within this group whether or not Godard is critiquing or reinforcing patriarchal representations of gender. While it is beyond the scope of the present article to address the many difficulties raised by women scholars with respect to Godard's presentation of gender and sexuality, I would like to propose that we use the silent film LE MYSTÈRE DES ROCHES DE KADOR as a starting point to rethink some of the issues of gender raised by Godard's films, or at least in the work dating from his first collaboration with Miéville, ICI ET AILLEURS, to the present.

The woman in LE MYSTÈRE DES ROCHES DE KADOR is an hysteric, her body excessively acting out both loss of memory (the catatonia) and the cure (the melodramatic gesture on memory's return, the flailing arms, the loss of consciousness). But where precisely are the curative powers of the cinema in LE MYSTÈRE DES ROCHES DE KADOR? Suzanne's encounter with the screen is much like our encounter with HISTOIRE(S) DU CINÉMA, that is, we see a history that runs back (the restaging) and forward (the alternative narrative possibility). So it is the movement backwards as much as forwards that is crucial here, indeed the very aspect of movement itself. Suzanne's immobility mirrors her rigid reading of the Captain's wound - that it must have come from her hand. Her illness is the product of her inability to perceive an alternative possibility or an image in movement. But this is not the only part of the cure. Suzanne's renewed health, signalled by the movement of her hands to her face in recognition, is interestingly enough not a self-recognition (the reenactment has been staged without her help, with another woman). That is to say, Suzanne's cure is the result of the image on the screen projecting a 'truth' back to her about the possibilities of the event, and in turn herself. Her cure is not simply being able to see the 'truth' of the shooting, but also her identification as a possibility other than herself. Or rather, she identifies beyond her presumed self, to another aspect of her self a type of simplification or recursive experience yet again.

The emphasis, then, is on the performative quality of the states. It is not only that the body is signalling the change, but that the change itself can be sudden and dramatic – a quantum shift. We have a type of 'irrational edit', but now at the level of the body rather than the film material, and the radical gesture draws our attention to our recursion between figure and ground,

between two seemingly opposing entities (mad/sane). Critical attention should thus be focused not so much on if Godard uses oppositional pairs of women (the virgin/whore dichotomy is particularly troublesome), but on how he uses the oppositions to foreground manifestations of gender as performances of gender. The slow and stop motion of HISTOIRE(S) DU CINÉMA returns to a scientific investigation of the gesture (e.g. Lupino and Ray in the opening moments of Chapter 1A), which runs parallel to a similar scrutiny of the voice (think of the screams and groans from the Steenbeck and Godard's manipulation of his own voice throughout). There is also the reference in both JLG/JLG and HISTOIRE(s) DU CINÉMA to Ray's JOHNNY GUITAR, 'lie to me, tell me all these years you've waited'. In all of these instances, the dissonance created between sound and image, or between words and inflection, functions like the 'irrational cut' focusing our attention to the gaps in our performance of gender. More radically, if we remember that Godard's larger understanding of cinema is read through his filter of 'metaphysics' (the openness or emptiness of matter), then an attention to the woman's body would be consistent with Judith Butler's reading of the category of sex as itself a type of performative utterance - a category that is constituted through, and naturalised by, the reiteration of particular norms. This process is not a unilateral or always efficient one since an ongoing series of constructions and destabilisations of the 'subject' is enacted. Perhaps most importantly for our context here, these repetitions or performances of sex occur in time.42

And this, I think, is the key to Godard's 'métaphysique': the break in the sequencing of the frames is a break in time, in that process of repetition and naturalisation. Godard's project thus remains 'faithful' to the altered opening quotation from Bresson, 'Leave for yourself a margin of indeterminacy'. It is the ongoing process of alteration at every level of the text that prevents the closure of the 'one' margin. To put this another way, the recursive strategy embedded at the heart of HISTOIRE(S) DU CINÉMA (the quoted text/image only slightly different) opens up the text into a matrix organisational structure, where the 'I' and the 'not I' and the 'you' all intersect. To put this back in the poetic language of Trinh T. Minh-ha: 'I am not I can be you and me'.<sup>43</sup>

It may seem peculiar to some feminists to utter Minh-ha and Butler's names in the same breath as Godard's. However, if we look at the larger theoretical framework and politics behind these different projects, I would argue there is more than a little intersection of methods and goals. Some have chosen to read this methodology spiritually (in the sense of transcendence) or formally (ambiguity read solely as aesthetic experimentation). Yet I would like to suggest that Godard's histoire(s) du cinéma has potentially

profound ethical implications (and his comments about the cinema of resistance throughout HISTOIRE(s) DU CINÉMA – especially Chapters 3A and 4B – and in interviews would reinforce that perspective). As Deleuze notes, 'Godard's aim is "to see the boundaries", in other words, to make the imperceptible visible'. The cinema of the impossible is more radically a cinema of the possible. It cannot be emphasised enough just how boldly Godard's later work demonstrates by example rather than precept the infinite possibilities for change that lie within our reach – starting with the thing Godard knows most intimately, his past experience of the cinema and his current hands-on practice of the transformation of the moving image. At several points throughout HISTOIRE(s) DU CINÉMA, Godard asks us, with Denis de Rougemont in mind, to 'think with our hands' ('penser avec les mains'), a radical merger of body and mind where matter is not *determined* by rational ideas, social constructs, and essentialist politics, but reaches outside this oppressive modality to embrace alterity as a way of being.

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## Notes to 8: The Evidence and Uncertainty of Silent Film in HISTOIRE(S) DU CINEMA

'[L]es masses/aiment le mythe/et le cinéma/s'adresse/aux masses/mais si le mythe/commence à Fantômas/il finit au Christ/qu'entendaient les foules/qui écoutaient/prêcher saint Bernard/autre chose que ce qu'il disait/peut-être, sans doute/mais comment négliger/ce que nous comprenons/à l'instant où cette voix inconnue/s'enfonce/au plus profound/de notre cœur' (Jean-Luc Godard, Histoire(s) du cinéma, Paris: Gallimard-Gaumont, 1998 (4 vols), vol. 1, pp. 96-100; all quotations from the video rely on the book version unless otherwise indicated). I would like to thank the Celeste Bartos International Film Study Center at The Museum of Modern Art in New York (John Harris and Sally Berger), and Electronic Arts Intermix in New York for their help with my research. Thanks also to Janet Bergstrom for the film reference and to James S. Williams for translation help (and a key film reference).

2 Quoted in Raymond Bellour, '(Not Just An Other Film-maker)', in: Raymond Bellour and Mary Lea Bandy (eds.), Jean-Luc Godard: Son+Image, 1974-1991, New York: Mu-

seum of Modern Art, 1992, pp. 221.

André Malraux, Esquisse d'une psychologie du cinéma, Paris: Gallimard, 1946. The full text by Malraux reads as follows: 'Le cinéma s'adresse aux masses, et les masses aiment le mythe, en bien et en mal. La guerre suffirait à nous le montrer, si nous voulions l'oublier: le stratège de café est un personnage moins répandu que "celui qui sait de source sûre que l'ennemi coupe les mains des enfants". Le journalisme, des fausses nouvelles aux feuilletons, ne ment que par mythes. Le mythe commence à Fantômas, mais il finit au Christ. Les foules sont loin de préférer toujours ce qu'il y a de meilleur en elles; pourtant elles le reconnaissent souvent. Qu'entendaient celles qui écoutaient prêcher saint Bernard? Autre chose que ce qu'il disait? Peut-être; sans doute. Mais comment négliger ce qu'elles comprenaient à l'instant où cette voix inconnue s'enfonçait au plus profond de leur cœur?'

A direct reference to the film appears in 'Dialogue entre Jean-Luc Godard et Serge Daney', Cahiers du Cinéma, no. 513, May 1997, pp. 49-55 (p. 50). A more elliptical remark about the film can be found in Godard's interview in 1989 with Noël Simsolo for Radio France Culture ('À voix nue', Entretiens d'hier et d'aujourd'hui, 20 November

1080)

5 Both Erreur tragique and the first three episodes of fantômas appear in 1913, but Erreur tragique's premiere was in January and the first episode of fantômas was in May. For a complete filmography of Feuillade, see Francis Lacassin, *Maître des lions et des vampires: Louis Feuillade*, Paris: Pierre Bordas et fils, 1995.

6 Interview with Simsolo, op. cit..

Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, trans. Arthur Mitchell, Mineola, N.Y.: Dover Publi-

cations, 1998, pp. 304-308.

8 The passage from the film is as follows: 'est-ce que tu as deux mains/demande l'aveugle/mais ce n'est pas en regardant/que je m'en assure/oui/pourquoi faire confiance à mes yeux/si j'en suis à douter/oui/pourquoi n'est-ce pas mes yeux/que je vais vérifier/en regardant/si je vois mes deux mains' (Histoire(s) du cinéma, vol. 1, p. 140). The passage from Wittgenstein can be found in Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Cer-

tainty, G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright (eds.), trans. Denis Paul and G.E.M. Anscombe, New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1969, pp. 18-19.

9 G.E. Moore, 'Proof of an External World', in: Philosophical Papers, New York: Collier Books, 1962, p. 133.

- 10 Ibid., p. 143.
- 11 Ibid., p. 147.
- 12 Ibid., p. 148.
- 13 Wittgenstein, On Certainty, op. cit., p. 3.
- 14 Ibid., p. 4.
- 15 Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, third edition, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, New York: MacMillan, 1958, p. 5.
- 16 Ibid., p. 32.
- 17 For a detailed discussion of the performative qualities of speech, see John R. Searle, Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969.
- 18 My reading of this passage by Godard is indebted to Judith Butler's discussion of the illusion of matter/sex/body as a fixed entity in *Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of 'Sex'*, New York: Routledge, 1993.
- 19 'Voilà, le cinéma est là pour faire de la métaphysique. C'est d'ailleurs ce qu'il fait mais on ne le voit pas ou alors ceux qui en font ne le disent pas. Le cinéma est quelque chose d'extrêmement physique de par son invention mécanique. C'est fait pour s'évader, et s'évader c'est de la métaphysique' ('J'ai toujours pensé que le cinéma était un instrument de pensée', Cahiers du Cinéma, no. 490, April 1995, p. 71).
- 20 My understanding of how the gaps or interstices in film and narrative function is deeply indebted to Hélène Cixous's discussion of the uncanny in the article, 'Fiction and Its Phantoms: A Reading of Freud's *Das Unheimliche* ("The Uncanny")', *New Literary History*, vol. 7, no. 3 (1976), pp. 525-548. The 'uncanny' is for Cixous 'a composite that infiltrates the interstices of the narrative and points to gaps we need to explain' (p. 16). Gilles Deleuze also points to the 'interstices' and 'gaps' throughout his discussion of Godard in *Cinema 2: The Time-Image* [1985], trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989, esp. p. 179.
- 21 Histoire(s) du cinéma, vol. 1, op. cit., p. 81.
- 22 The full quotation does not appear in the text of *Histoire(s) du cinéma* as published, but sounds as follows: 'Histoires du cinéma, avec un "s"; toutes les histoires qu'il y aurait, qu'il y aurait, qu'il y a eu... qu'il y a eu...
- 23 'Ne va pas montrer/tous les côtés des choses/garde, toi/une marge/d'indéfini' (Histoire(s) du cinéma vol. 1, op. cit., pp. 15-17).
- 24 The passage as it appears in *Histoire(s) du cinéma*, vol. 1, op. cit., pp. 259-266 is as follows: 'les poètes/sont ceux des mortels qui/chantant gravement/ressentent la trace des dieux enfuis/restent sur cette trace/et tracent ainsi aux mortels/leurs frères/le chemin du revirement/mais qui/des mortels/est capable de déceler/une telle trace/il appartient aux traces/d'être souvent inapparentes/et elles sont toujours/le legs d'une assignation/à peine pressentie/être poète/en temps/de détresse/c'est alors/chantant/être attentif/à la trace/des dieux enfuis/voilà pourquoi/au temps de la nuit du monde/le poète dit le sacré'. The original text from Heidegger reads as follows: 'Poets are the mortals who, singing earnestly of the wine god, sense the trace of the fugitive gods, stay on the gods' tracks, and so trace for their kindred mortals the

way toward the turning. The ether, however, in which alone the gods are gods, is their godhead. The element of this ether, that within which even the godhead itself is still present, is the holy. The element of the ether for the coming of the fugitive gods, the holy, is the track of the fugitive gods. But who has the power to sense, to trace such a track? Traces are often inconspicuous, and are always the legacy of a directive that is barely divined. To be a poet in a destitute time means: to attend, singing, to the trace of the fugitive gods. This is why the poet in the time of the world's night utters the holy' ('What are Poets For?', in: Martin Heidegger, *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. Albert Hofstadter, New York: Harper, 1971, p. 94).

- 25 Ibid., p. 96.
- 26 Ibid., p. 92.
- 27 Ibid., p. 108.
- 28 Deleuze, Cinema 2, op. cit., p. 179.
- 29 Ibid., p. 180.
- 30 For a detailed description of how these 'shock' cuts work in Feuillade, see my articles, 'The Innovators 1910-1920: Detailing the Impossible', Sight & Sound, April 1999, pp. 28-30, and 'Zones of Anxiety: Movement, Musidora, and the Crime Serials of Louis Feuillade', Velvet Light Trap, vol. 37, Spring 1996, pp. 37-50.
- 31 Deleuze, Cinema 2, op. cit., p. 182.
- 32 The original French reads: 'Singulière fortune où le but se déplace,/Et, n'étant nulle part, peut être n'importe où!'. Both the French and English versions appear in Charles Baudelaire, *The Flowers of Evil and Paris Spleen*, trans. William H. Crosby, Brockport: BOA Editions, 1991, pp. 252-253
- 33 Deleuze, Cinema 2, op. cit., p. 60.
- 34 Martin Heidegger, 'Conversations on a Country Path', Discourse on Thinking (a translation of Gelassenheit), trans. John M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund, New York: Harper, 1966, p. 61.
- 35 Ibid., pp. 88-89.
- 36 Ibid., p. 75.
- 37 Douglas Hofstadter, Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid, Toronto: Basic Books, 1980, p. 127.
- 38 For an example, see M.C. Escher, 'Day and Night', ibid., p. 252.
- 39 Ellen Draper, 'An Alternative to Godard's Metaphysics: Cinematic Presence in Miéville's Le Livre de Marie', in: Maryel Locke and Charles Warren (eds.), HAIL MARY: Women and the Sacred in Film, Carbondale: Southern Illinois Press, 1994, p. 69.
- 40 Trinh T. Minh-ha, 'Film as Translation' (with Scott MacDonald), in: Framer Framed, New York: Routledge, 1992, p. 122.
- 41 See especially, *Camera Obscura*, vols. 8-9-10 (Fall 1982). The introduction is reprinted in Bellour and Bandy, *Son+Image*, op. cit., along with Laura Mulvey's article, 'The Hole and the Zero: the Janus Face of the Feminine in Godard' (pp. 75-88). The collection, HAIL MARY: *Women and the Sacred in Film*, provides an interesting range of perspectives on Godard, some more explicitly feminist than others.
- 42 Butler, Bodies That Matter, op. cit., p. 10.
- 43 Trinh T. Minh-ha, Woman/Native/Other: Writing Postcoloniality and Feminism, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, p. 90.
- 44 Gilles Deleuze, 'Three questions about SIX FOIS DEUX', in: Bellour and Bandy, Son+Image, op. cit., p. 41.